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Experience-based decisions can be defined as decisions emanating 
from direct or vicarious reinforcements that were received in the 
past. For example, in a typical setting a person initially faces blank 
buttons and needs to press any of them without prior informa-
tion concerning the selection outcomes. Upon pressing a button 
the participant receives monetary outcomes (e.g., “you won $5”) 
and then, based on this experience, makes another selection. Quite 
often hundreds of trials of this sort are administered. The outcomes 
of the two alternatives are usually sampled from different payoff 
distributions (e.g., a button producing a fixed payoff of $5 could 
be contrasted with a button producing risky payoff, such as wining 
$9 or $1 with equal likelihood). This allows examining the decision 
response to different incentive structures without explicit informa-
tion concerning their statistical properties.
The current Research Topic aims to integrate various works 
in this area that have been conducted in Decision science and 
Neuroscience. The study of experience-based decisions has recently 
revealed some robust regularities that differ from how people make 
decisions based on descriptions (i.e., where the participants have 
full information about the outcome distributions but no feedback). 
For example, people were found to underweight small probability 
events in experience-based decisions, while overweighting them in 
decisions based on descriptions. This is now commonly referred 
to as the description-experience gap (Hertwig and Erev, 2009). In 
parallel to the recent advancement in Decision Science, neurosci-
entists have for a long while used the experience-based decisions 
paradigm for analyzing brain-behavior interactions. For example, 
phenomena such as the feedback-based Error-Related Negativity 
(fERN) in event-related potentials (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002) 
and the role of non-declarative knowledge in selecting advanta-
geously were discovered using experience-based tasks. The goal of 
the current Research Topic was to combine these two disciplinary 
sources concerning experience-based decisions.
As expected, several works in this Research Topic explored the 
“underweighting rare event” tendency. Zhang and Maloney (2012) 
propose a logit model for this tendency as well as some other robust 
biases, and also suggest that the underweighting tendency may 
be driven by basic properties of neural transmission. Upton et al. 
(2012) propose that underweighting rare events may underlie some 
of the differences found between neuropsychological populations 
and controls in complex tasks such as the Iowa Gambling task. By 
contrast Glöckner et al. (2012) do not replicate the underweight-
ing phenomena in decisions from sampling both in behavior as 
well as in eye point of gaze. Finally, Nevo and Erev (2012) inves-
tigate the immediate aftermath of a rare event and highlight a 
phenomenon whereby surprising events trigger a change in the 
participants’ response.
Other authors focused on the issue of consistent preferences in 
experience-based tasks. Yechiam and Telpaz (2011) demonstrate 
 consistency between tonic (at rest) arousal and risk taking, and show 
that it is more prominent in tasks with losses. In an important cri-
tique, Marchiori and Elqayam (2012) present some boundaries for 
consistency in risk taking. Ert (2012) retorts by arguing that most of 
these boundaries have been demonstrated in decisions from descrip-
tion, while in experience-based decisions consistency of individual 
differences is more robust. Relating to this, Warren and Holroyd 
(2012) show that the rapid fERN phenomena, which demarcates 
the rapid frontal cortical sensitivity to negative/positive outcomes, 
is larger in a condition involving active learning similar to an expe-
rience-based task, than in a condition involving passive learning.
Wang et al. (2012) examine the issue of whether choices in an 
experience-based task are guided by unconscious motivations, as 
evidenced by advantageous choices in the absence of conscious 
awareness of the difference between outcomes. Their results suggest 
a role for unconscious motivations. Such findings are very often 
interpreted as denoting dual processes or systems. Investigating 
the influence of dual processes, Hawes et al. (2012) focus on cog-
nitive strategies in a complex decision task and their neural cor-
relates, and their result demonstrate a combination of bottom-up 
experience-based learning and abstract learning. Sela et al. (2012) 
focus on an inhibition-related dual process and show that weak 
transcranial stimulation in the left hemisphere has the ability to 
affect risk taking, stressing the role of balance between theta activ-
ity in the two hemispheres. Finally, Warren and Holroyd (2012) 
propose two neuromodulatory systems in learning and decision 
making but stress the context-specific nature of the conditions 
for the activation of these two systems. For instance, changing the 
task context from gender to color provided sufficient conditions 
for differentially activating the two systems.
Finally, several authors examined the effect of social versus pri-
vate environments, a research area often addressed by both decision 
and neuroscience models. Grygolec et al. (2012) show that in an 
experience-based task both the striatal and behavioral response to 
risk greatly differs in a social versus private setting. Investigating a 
similar domain, de Bruijn and von Rhein (2012) find that the con-
text in which a person makes a decision with other people greatly 
determines how others’ payoffs are perceived and the frontal mecha-
nisms activated upon them. In a related work, Fahrenfort et al. (2012) 
show that sharing in a public good game prompts activation of neural 
systems associated with reward (striatum), but also empathy (ante-
rior insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex). Finally, Marchiori 
and Warglien’s (2011) study demonstrates that a neurally inspired 
model can explain changes in participants’ responses to different social 
dilemmas.
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different contexts. Contexts that facilitate the relation between frontal 
processes and behavior, and have been discussed in this Research 
Topic, include the availability of active choice, feedback, and losses. 
This sheds light on why experience-based tasks, which typically 
include these three components, are quite often used in neuropsy-
chological assessment batteries for evaluating brain dysfunctions.
We believe that the current Research Topic led to some transfusion 
of ideas between the two disciplinary sources of Decision science 
and Neuroscience in key issues related to experience-based deci-
sions (though see our concluding paper for some gaps that remain 
unresolved). Reflecting on one emergent theme, it appears that brain-
behavior relations are quite unstable and may form or unform in 
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